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Focusing on parties and party systems must remain a basic if not 
the central theme for examining the quality of […] liberal democracy 
Pridham (1990:2) 
 
Introduction 
Almost two decades have passed since the Third Wave of democratization brought an 
avalanche of new, relatively unstable democracies into being in Eastern Europe. Although 
democracy and a market economy seem to have taken firm root, at least for the ten Eastern 
European countries currently members of the European Union (EU), in the light of the 
complicated post-communist legacy, this may have not been enough time for their political 
parties and party systems to institutionalize. Moreover, a well-rehearsed litany of complaints 
has been recited against the countries in the region encompassing, inter alia, weak 
governability and accountability, a representation deficit; corruption and clientelism, 
populism, and threats to democratic stability; raising once again the question, “How 
important the former (i.e. political parties and party systems) are for the quality of 
democracy?” 
Reflecting Huntington´s famous critique in the second half of the 1960s, a 
preoccupation with weak institutions has been a recurrent theme in the (usually pessimistic) 
democratic literature of the past decade. In this vast and growing literature there is a 
widespread agreement that, whether in Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 
2007), Asia (Johnson, 2002; Stockton, 2001), Europe (Lewis, 1994; Morlino, 1998) or Latin 
America (Dix, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), few institutional developments are more 
critical to the consolidation and healthy functioning of democracy than the development of 
institutionalized political parties and party systems. Further, there is a general perception 
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that “the contribution of parties [and party systems] gets increasingly important as the 
process [of democratization] evolves” (Randall and Svåsand, 2002:5). Examining the level of 
party and party system institutionalization constitutes then an essential task, given the fact 
that such institutions can in fact foment the quality of democracy (Diamond and Linz, 1989; 
Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998; Pridham, 1990; Mainwaring, 1998; Tóka, 1997). 
The link between weak party/party system institutionalization and lower quality 
democracy has been examined in a myriad of countries and regions (see, e.g. Dix, 1992; 
Hicken, 2006; Johnson, 2002; Lewis, 2006; Mainwaring, 1999; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; 
Markowski, 2000; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001, 2005; Tóka, 1997). In general terms, the 
relationship between (party/party system) institutionalization and the operation of 
democratic institutions is considered to have neither a unidirectional or linear nature 
(Diamond, 1997; Huntington, 1968; Powell, 1982; Stockton, 2001; Wallis, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the majority of these studies takes the form of either single-country case 
studies or do not statistically test the relationship between institutionalization and the level 
of democracy (Stockton, 2001; and Thames and Robbins, 2007 are the only exceptions). 
Moreover, while most analyses view political parties and party systems as an independent 
variable or, at best, as an intervening variable, they almost always fail to operationalize the 
dependent variable, or to correlate the independent and dependent variables. Hence the 
conclusion of Foweraker (1998:675) that the “present state of comparative analysis does 
demonstrate, beyond reasonable doubt, that the institutional variation across regimes has 
significant implications for governability” is itself open to doubt. In this sense, what those 
comparative analyses demonstrate is, at best, variability in the independent variable and 
some conceptual grounds for supposing this has an impact on the dependent variable.  
Seeking to begin to fill this gap in the literature, this paper attempts to statistically 
analyse the effect of weak party/party system institutionalization on the quality of 
democracy. The goals for this research are, therefore, two-fold. First, using Mair (2000) and 
Lewis (2006) as a foundation, assumptions are tested about the direction of the relationship 
between political party and competitive party system institutionalization and quality of 
democracy in Eastern European political systems relative to each other. Second, the 
challenge put forth by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) to extend this investigation into another 
region of the world by examining new democracies in Europe is pursued. 
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. First, I outline the conceptualization 
debate regarding party/party system institutionalization and the quality of democracy. 
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Second, I briefly review the literature explaining the hypotheses that both weak party and 
party system institutionalization should undermine the quality of a democracy. Third, I 
identify indicators for all the variables examined, with application to Eastern European 
democracies. Fourth, an empirical analysis of the relationship between party (system) 
institutionalization and the level of democracy is presented. Finally, the conclusion addresses 
the significance of the results achieved. 
 
Party and party system institutionalization  
Any scholar who studies the institutionalization of political parties and party systems faces 
the problem of the unit of analysis. Should the main emphasis of a study be on individual 
political parties, party systems, or both? Are there differences between institutionalization of 
single parties and party systems? 
The mainstream literature on the subject does not, in fact, differentiate between 
institutionalization of these two units. Beginning with the seminal works by Samuel 
Huntington (1965, 1968), most scholars approach the institutionalization of individual parties 
and party systems interchangeably, “the implication being that [since individual political 
parties constitute integral parts of the whole party system] the institutionalization of the 
party system directly depends on that of individual parties” (Meleshevich, 2007:16). 
The relationship between these two notions is, however, not nearly so simple and 
deterministic: for while individual political parties may be institutionalized, their operation in 
a party system may not be, and viceversa. In this sense, Randall and Svåsand (2002:6) are 
correct when they argue that, although closely related, “individual party institutionalization 
and the institutionalization of the party system are neither the same thing nor necessarily 
and always mutually compatible”.2 In fact, while in some instances the institutionalization of 
political parties, their organizational stability and continuity might prove conducive to party 
system institutionalization, in others they could be at odds with this, particularly in the case 
of young democracies.3 As a result of this lack of conceptual clarity or absence of consistent 
analytical frameworks, research on (party and party system) institutionalization has thus far 
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led to contradictory or at least inconclusive assessments on the relationship between 
institutionalization and democracy.4 
 For all the abovementioned reasons, in approaching the relationship between 
political institutionalization and the quality of democracy, the first problem which needs to 
be examined is the distinction between party system institutionalization, on the one hand, and 
party institutionalization on the other, and, with this, the allied problem of when precisely the 
latter also implies the former. In order to do so, it is necessary first to put some flesh on 
the bones of both concepts. 
Party System Institutionalization 
Although it may be difficult to believe given its central importance, the concept of 
party system institutionalization5 has no established definition. The concept was first 
introduced by Mainwaring and Scully in their classic Building Democratic Institutions: Party 
Systems in Latin America (1995). There, the authors defined the institutionalization of a party 
system as: 
[The] process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely 
known, if not universally accepted. Actors develop expectations, orientations, and 
behaviour based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the 
foreseeable future (1995:4). 
According to the two authors, institutionalized party systems are characterised by 
four different dimensions: regular patterns of inter-party competition, strong party roots in 
society, electoral and partisan legitimacy, and solid party organizations. While their 
discussion of the four dimensions is sufficient, Mainwaring and Scully fail to provide objective 
measures for the last two dimensions (i.e. legitimacy and party organization). 
Most authors follow Mainwaring and Scully´s pattern of proposing a series of 
“dimensions” of party system institutionalization. Morlino (1995) claims that “structured” 
party systems must be stable in terms of electoral behaviour, partisan competition and 
political class; Bielasiak (2001), who is interested in the institutionalization of party systems 
in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet States, distinguishes three dimensions of stability: 
electoral democracy, political contestation, and political representation; Grzymała-Busse 
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(2002) suggests that institutionalization combines political freedom, party control of the 
political process, and policy-based party competition; and, even more explicit, Meleshevich 
(2007) conceives of it as involving both (external) autonomy and (internal) stability. 
Interestingly enough, there is only one exception to this principle of simply enumerating 
dimensions (i.e. Randall and Svåsand, 2002), but by and large this exception lacks an 
appropriate set of measures, weakening what is, otherwise, a thoughtful theoretical model.6 
 It is clear, then, that political scientists have conceptualized institutionalization in 
numerous ways. Most agree on some ingredients of the process but no two arrive at the 
same final combination of elements. Criticisms of the conceptual and operational 
approaches of these studies appear elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2007), but the fundamental 
problem that can be seen running through all these works is that they tend to pay very little 
attention to the notion of conceptualization. How, then, can we define the concept of party 
system institutionalization? 
Strictly speaking, we can only speak of institutionalization when we can define what it 
is that has been institutionalized. Our first task then is, perhaps, insurmountable, to specify 
the “essence” of what constitutes a given party system. Sartori (1976:43-44) offers the 
clearest definition of this: 
[T]he concept of system is meaningless […] unless (i) the system displays properties 
that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements and (ii) 
the system results from, and consists of, the patterned interactions of its 
component parts, thereby […] a party system is precisely the system of interactions 
resulting from inter-party competition. 
This definition has four different implications. First, a party system must consist of 
more than a single party (otherwise there is no interparty competition). Second, a party 
system clearly involves something more than the sum of its component (i.e. political parties) 
parts, and incorporates some element of understanding of the mode of interaction between 
these parties. Three, the notion of pattern implies some degree of regularity in the 
interactions among political parties. Four, this pattern must be enduring – suggesting some 
continuity of inter-party interactions between elections.  
Once the nature of what constitutes a party system has been established, then it 
becomes possible to define party system institutionalization, and, hence, to specify the 
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dimensions which can determine whether any given system is already institutionalized or still 
remains weakly institutionalized. 
All meanings of the conception of institutionalization contain the idea of stability and 
persistence over time (Riker and Ordershook, 1973; Stinchcombe, 1968; Scott, 1995). 
Taking into consideration that the core of a party system is to be found in the patterns of 
interaction among its subunits (i.e. political parties), it seems clear that the most important 
and necessary attribute of party system institutionalization is stability in the rules and nature 
of inter-party competition. As Mainwaring and Scully stated in their seminal analysis of Latin 
American political parties, “where such stability does not exist, institutionalization is limited” 
(1995:4-5). In other words, the more stable the system (i.e., structured inter-interaction), 
the more institutionalized it is (Przeworski, 1975; Mair, 2000). 
Bearing in mind all that has been said, and drawing on Huntington´s (1968:12) original 
definition of institutionalization as the “process by which organizations and procedures 
acquire value and stability”, I define party system institutionalization as the process by which 
the patterns of inter-party competition and alliances (interaction) become routine, predictable and 
stable over time.7 Hence, in institutionalized party systems, voters face fixed choices among a 
manageable number of political parties, which relate to each other in a regular and 
predictable fashion, forming stable alliances. In this sense, a system of parties can be said to 
be institutionalized when it can deliver in a predictable manner durable governments based 
upon a firm allegiance between groups of citizens and their parties. As a consequence, in 
institutionalized party systems political actors develop a stable set of expectations and 
orientations about how decisions will be made and order maintained such that random 
shocks or deviant behaviours cannot alter the fundamental patterns of competition (which 
are presumed to prevail into the foreseeable future). This is also the reason why Sartori 
(1976) in his seminal work emphasized the need for a distinction between “structured” and 
“unstructured” party systems, the latter being in flux, presenting unclear and untested 
alternative to voters. 
Party Institutionalization 
Although widely employed in the literature, the concept of party institutionalization 
has often been poorly or ambiguously defined. Sometimes the notion is simply equated with 
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that of party system institutionalization. Sometimes the term is simply used without further 
explanation. Hence, the lingering uncertainty about its “real” meaning. 
Even if a number of scholars had employed the concept of institutionalization before, 
it was Huntington (1968) the first one who argued that it could well be applied to the 
analysis of political parties. Unfortunately, he did not spend that much time grappling with 
the concept and defining its precise meaning (just one sentence). Instead, he preferred to 
focus on the four indicators of the concept, namely: adaptability, autonomy, complexity, 
coherence. 
Most scholars prefer to follow this pattern and merely suggest a series of 
“dimensions” or “ingredients” of institutionalization and then hasten to “operationalize” 
them. Janda (1980) suggests that an institutionalized political party must be “reified in the 
public mind”, and he immediately proceeds to apply this criterion – operationalized with six 
different variables - to the cross-national analysis of Western political parties; Panebianco 
(1988), a classic in the political science literature (Ware, 1996:94), applies the concept to 
the study of Western European political parties, identifying two different dimensions (i.e. 
autonomy and systemness); Dix (1992), who is interested in party institutionalization in Latin 
America, simply apply Huntington´s conceptual framework, although with a completely new 
set of operational indicators; Mainwaring and Scully (1995), clearly ignoring “the possibility 
for conflict between party and party system institutionalization” (Randall and Svåsand, 
2002:7), incorporate in their voluminous work on Latin American party systems two 
dimensions (i.e. stable party roots in society and party organization) more appropriate to the 
study of party institutionalization than to the analysis of party systems per se; finally Jin 
(1995), in his study of party institutionalization in South Korea, includes the last two 
dimensions, while adding a further one (i.e. party efficacy in the legislative process). 
As with the concept of party system institutionalization examined above, the 
fundamental problem running through all these studies is that they tend to pay very little 
attention to conceptualization. In fact, all of the abovementioned works are almost 
exclusively oriented toward an empirical assessment of institutionalization, but as we already 
know valid empirical analysis needs first a sound conceptual base. In this context, two 
studies are extremely remarkable, namely: Levitsky´s (1998) analysis of the transformation 
of the Justicialist Party in Argentina, and Randall and Svåsand´s (2002) analysis of the 
institutionalization of political parties in the “Third World”. 
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Well aware of the disjuncture between the initial conception of institutionalization 
and the way it has been elaborated and related to specific criteria by the majority of 
scholars, Levitsky suggests that “the concept of [party] institutionalization be unpacked” 
(1998:88). Thus, bearing in mind the predominant conceptualizations of institutionalization 
used in the literature of political parties, Levitsky distinguishes two different elements: (1) 
value infusion (i.e., the process by which an organization becomes infused with value beyond 
the technical requirement of task in hand), and (2) behavioural routinization (i.e., the 
routinization of the - formal or informal - “rules of the game” within a party). These are two 
different elements which do not necessarily occur or vary together. For this reason, political 
scientists interested in the study of party institutionalization should either conceptualize 
them separately, or clearly distinguish between them, when employed as part of the same 
concept. 
Clearly influenced by Levitsky´s work, Randall and Svåsand distinguished four 
different dimensions of party institutionalization, understood as “the process by which [a] 
party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of 
attitudes, or culture” (2002:12). On the one hand, within the internal sphere,8 both authors 
distinguish between systemness9 (i.e., the increasing scope, density and regularity of the 
interactions that constitute the party as a structure) and value infusion which refers to the 
extent to which party actors and supporters acquire an identification with and commitment 
to a party. On the other hand, the external dimension includes autonomy (i.e., the degree of 
differentiation from other social groups and methods of behaviour), and reification which, 
capturing Janda´s notion, requires the party´s existence to be established in the public 
imagination (2001:80). Unfortunately, no appropriate indicators of the four dimensions 
above-cited are provided.10 
 As follows from this discussion, it becomes clear that the concept of “party 
institutionalization” is multifaceted, difficult to operationalize, and sometimes conducive to 
tautological argument. As a result, there is great deal of disagreement among scholars 
concerning the ways of conceptualizing the criteria of party institutionalization, their 
operationalization and measurement. 
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 Although no scholars have arrived at the same set of dimensions of party 
institutionalization, two broad areas of consensus concerning the elements of this concept 
seem to emerge from our analysis: the study of the institutionalization of a political party 
calls for a discussion of its rootedness and systemness. Party institutionalization involves then a 
combination of stable roots in society and firmly established and routinized organizational 
structures. In this sense, a party is more or less institutionalized to the extent that citizens 
in general and voters in particular infuse it with value, and party members behave in 
accordance with the procedures and norms established by the organization. Hence, party 
institutionalization can be defined as the process by which parties evince consistent patterns of 
mass mobilization, internal organization and leadership succession. In other words, when 
institutionalized, parties are expected to remain consistent with respect to party platform, 
ideology, label and organization, and therefore to maintain a fairly stable level of citizen 
support. This will clearly prevent them from disappearing from election to election, while 
helping to increase the legitimacy of the state partisan institutions such as the government, 
the parliament, the political class, etc. 
 
The quality of democracy  
Similarly to the two phenomena previously studied, and as we will have the opportunity to 
see, the concept of “quality of democracy” is notoriously contested (Andreev, 2005). Even if 
some of the aspects of the quality of democracy had been the subject of empirical 
investigation before, it was Lijphart the first one who provided political scientists with a 
definition of the concept as “the degree to which a system meets such democratic norms as 
representativeness, accountability, equality and participation” (1993:149). In other words, in 
order to be considered a quality democracy, a polity not only has to fulfil a minimum of 
democratic principles, but it has to do so in a certain degree. Unfortunately, he did not 
spend that much time grappling with the notion. Instead, he preferred to focus on the 
different indicators of the concept, which not only were discussed insufficiently, but failed to 
provide a measure for all of the dimensions above-cited (e.g. accountability). 
As in the case of our previous concept (i.e. institutionalization), the majority of 
scholars prefer to follow this pattern and simply refer to certain characteristics of the 
political (democratic) system itself, without examining the notion of “quality” itself. Putnam 
(1993) parallels the quality of democracy with institutional performance and government 
responsiveness; Lijphart (1999), once again, incorporates in his analysis of thirty-six 
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democracies such dimensions as female representation, electoral participation, satisfaction 
with democracy, and corruption; Altman and Pérez-Liñan (2002), who are interested in the 
functioning of democracy in Latin America, distinguish three aspects of quality: civil rights, 
participation, and competition; finally, Inglehart and Welzel (2008) suggests that “efficient” 
democracy combines formal democracy and elite integrity. In fact, the only exception to this 
principle of simply enumerating dimensions is Diamond and Morlino (2005), who in their 
introductory essay to Assessing the Quality of Democracy helpfully lay out a definition of the 
notion. However, while their discussion of the eight dimensions of quality is sufficient, the 
two authors fail to provide objective measures for the majority of them, weakening what is, 
otherwise, a solicitous theoretical model.  
As it follows from the previous discussion, it seems clear that the normative and 
empirical implications of the concept, the lack of comparable information and, especially, the 
confusion with numerous terms that refer to similar things (“good” democracy, “effective” 
democracy, etc.) have made it difficult for scholars to agree on one definition (not to say 
measure) of the quality of democracy. 
In this paper, and departing from Dahl´s (1971) minimum definition of democracy as 
entailing (1) a government responsive to citizen needs, (2) a set of institutionally protected 
rights and liberties, and (3) a process of contested elections with broad suffrage (Dahl 
1971), I considered democratic quality to be characterised by “a stable institutional 
structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct 
functioning of its institutions and mechanisms” (Morlino, 2006:7). In this sense, quality of 
democracy refers to the extent to which any given polity actualises its potential in terms of 
freedom, equality, accountability, responsiveness, and rule of law (Morlino, 2006). 
 
On the relationship between institutionalization and the quality of democracy  
Comparative political theory points to a number of reasons why both party and party 
system institutionalization may foster the quality of democracy in a polity. Let´s see each of 
them in turn. 
Party system institutionalization and the Quality of Democracy 
According to the majority of scholars, few institutional developments are more 
dangerous to the healthy functioning of democracy than the development of weakly 
institutionalized party systems (Kitschelt et al., 1995; Mainwaring, 1999; Powell, 1982; 
Przeworski, 1975). According to Mainwaring and Torcal (2006), one of the main negative 
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consequences of low systemic institutionalization is the lack of programmatic 
representation. Thus, in weakly institutionalized party systems, political elites are more 
willing for the simply sake of power to overlook programmatic differences and furnish ad 
hoc political coalitions. As a result, citizens not only have problems to identify what the 
different political parties stand for, but also which parties are to be considered responsible 
for unwise or ineffective public policies (Birch, 2003). In the same vein, because in weakly 
institutionalized party systems voters find it almost impossible to “throw the rascals” out of 
office they may become increasingly frustrated with the system, rising the potential for 
voters to be attracted to populist parties and demagogic leaders, which not only tend to 
pursue policy measures with an eye toward publicity, but also may threaten the survival of 
the regime (Innes, 2002; Mainwaring, 1998).11 Moreover, in the tradition of Huntington 
(1968), O´Dwyer (2006) and Lewis (2006) theorized that fairly institutionalized party 
systems succeed to prevent, respectively, the patronage-led expansion of the state 
bureaucracy and corruption. Last but not least, some studies have hypothesized that the 
party system institutionalization contributes to the quality of democracy because it enhances 
the quality, stability, and predictability of the policymaking process (Dimitrov et al., 2006; 
O´Dwyer and Kovalčík, 2007; Tommassi, 2006). 
 In conclusion, and bearing in mind that 
Institutionalized party systems […] increase democratic governability and legitimacy 
by facilitating legislative support for government policies; by channelling demands 
and conflicts through established procedures; by reducing the scope for populist 
demagogues to win power; and by making the democratic process more inclusive, 
accessible, representative, and effective (Diamond, 1997:xxiii) 
it seems plausible to expect a positive correlation between the degree of party system 
institutionalization in a polity and a nation´s level of democratic quality (Hypothesis 1). 
Party institutionalization and the Quality of Democracy 
In one of the most famous quotes in the history of the analysis of political parties, 
Schattschneider (1942:1) wrote that “political parties created democracy and […] modern 
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties”. Although perhaps an extreme claim, 
few observers would deny that despite evident challenges to the position of political parties, 
such as the rise of new social movements and the extension of bureaucratic power, 
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democracy at the state level cannot operate effectively for very long without the organizing 
and channelling capabilities of institutionalized political parties (Diamond, 1989:21; 
Huntington, 1968; Mainwaring, O´Donnell, and Valenzuela, 1992). 
More specifically, we may say that party institutionalization has positive implications 
for democratic accountability, both vertical and horizontal. In terms of the latter, politicians 
will be more accountable to party leaders in strongly organized political parties. In terms of 
the other, it seems clear that if party platforms come and go, appearing in one election and 
disappearing in the next, voters will surely encounter problems to perform any kind of 
retrospective evaluation of political parties and elites. Furthermore, as Zielinśki, Słomczynśki 
and Shabad (2005) have probed, if party organizations are weak, discipline is lax, and 
defections are common, accountability will be hampered as voters will find it almost 
impossible to punish legislators for poor performance or lack of representation. The latter 
aspect also points to inability of weakly institutionalized political parties to represent the 
interest of their voters. In fact, in systems where (generally badly organized) political parties 
lack stable roots in society, support for political organization tends to be low (Mainwaring 
and Scully, 1995). The problem is that in context like this, citizens may look for alternative 
(probably undemocratic) ways of representation, regardless of how well other institutions 
of the state are functioning (Innes, 2002).12 Likewise, low levels of party institutionalization 
can have also negative consequences in terms of responsiveness: because party members 
see party platforms simply as an effective mean to fulfil their particular interests, and not as 
a tool to pursue common programmatic goals, they tend to act according to their own 
personal interests, and not to the preferences of voters (Levitsky, 1998). Finally, weakly 
institutionalized partisan organizations are more prone to be the prey of 
populist/charismatic leaders and become personal vehicles to power, with all the dangers 
this may have for the good functioning of democracy (e.g., personalistic control of candidate 
selection, lack of professionalization, etc.) and the consolidation of the regime (McGuire, 
1997). 
In conclusion, it follows from the above that since political parties can only 
satisfactorily fulfil many of their presumed democratic functions if the configuration of 
parties remains relatively stable and their intra-party organization endures, a positive 
                                                 
12 In this sense, it is important to note that the presence of well institutionalized party organizations, with their 
political connections, can help to stave off, or at make more difficult attempt to usurp power and implement 
an undemocratic regime (e.g. .Spain in 1936). 
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relationship between party institutionalization and the quality of democracy is expected 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 
Data and method  
The main goal of this paper is to test empirically for the effect party and party system 
institutionalization have on overall quality of democracy in a medium-N, cross-national 
framework. In our dataset, we include all those consolidated Eastern European democracies 
that have had a meaningful experience with democracy since the collapse of communism in 
1989. Consolidated refers to all those political regimes which can already be labelled as 
“polyarchies”, as in theory the quality of democracy can only be examined in those polities 
fulfilling a minimum of democratic principles (Altman and Pérez-Liñan, 2002:1; Diamond and 
Morlino, 2005; Coppedge, 1997:179-180).13 
Following the assumptions mentioned in the previous section about the importance 
of political parties and party systems in shaping the quality of democracy, this article tests 
the following two propositions: (a) as the degree of party system institutionalization 
increases, the quality of democracy increases; and (b) as the degree of political party 
institutionalization increases, the quality of democracy increases. To test these hypotheses, 
we must identify indicators of democratic quality and institutionalization as well as assess 
whether or not the latter accounts for any variation within the former´s values. 
Because democracy scores are not available for every country in every year, a time 
series analysis will not be attempted. Cross-national comparisons will be made on the basis 
of the relative system and party institutionalization scores of each country with their relative 
quality of democracy scores in the period analysed. 
The test of the relationship between variables is a simple one: analyze the correlation 
between the degree of party and party system institutionalization in these countries and the 
scores they receive in terms of democratic quality. Based on these findings, the best line of 
fit through the sample universe is examined. Three lines are attempted: linear, quadratic, 
and cubic; the line with the best fit best expresses the direction of the relationship. The 
value of this simple test is that it provides us with a visualization of the empirical relationship 
between cases. Due to the small sample size (9 countries), a more sophisticated regression 
technique will not be used in this paper. 
                                                 
13 Nations in Transit has an official minimum value (at 2.99 on a 1-7 scale) for a “consolidated” democracy. 
Consequently, all those Eastern European political regimes above the abovementioned threshold have been 
excluded from the analysis. 
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Party system institutionalization in Eastern European democracies  
The task of finding reliable and precise operational indicators for the empirical assessment of 
the conceptual scheme displayed above proves to be anything but easy. In this paper, and in 
order to analyse the institutionalization of party systems in new Southern and Eastern 
European democracies, I rely on Mair´s (2000, 2007) model of party system analysis. There 
are three main reasons for this. In the first place, and more obviously, Mair´s approach, 
advocating an interpretation of system institutionalization which addresses a party system´s 
“core” (i.e., “the principal modes of interaction between parties and the way they compete 
with one another”, 2006:65), enables party system institutionalization to be analysed 
independently of the static parameters of the subsystems (i.e. parties).14 Second, through 
dealing with party system institutionalization in such terms, it becomes possible to evaluate 
different degrees of party system institutionalization.15 Third, the latter can be done on the 
basis of a minimal number of robust indicators that “provide for large-scale geographic and 
inter-temporal comparisons” (Müller and Fallend, 2004:804). 
 According to Mair, the institutionalization of a party system occurs only when the 
patterns of interaction among political parties in successive periods of government 
formation become predictable and stable over time. In order to mark when a party system 
develops predictable and stable patterns of inter-party competition (for executive positions) 
and, thereby, to determine whether that system has institutionalized, he proposes to analyse 
three different, although clearly related, factors. The first is patterns of alternations in 
government: whether, in the case of a change of government, there is a total (wholesale) 
alternation of government in terms of its party composition, whether there is only partial 
alternation of this composition or whether there is no change at all.16 The second factor, 
innovation or familiarity of government alternatives, indicates whether there are stable groups of 
parties that tend to govern together (familiarity) or whether there is a systemic tendency 
towards previously unseen party compositions being represented in the executive 
(innovation). The third factor that Mair proposes to analyse is party access to government. 
This is to indicate whether over a selected period of time all parties had a chance to enjoy 
                                                 
14 If party and party system institutionalization are not the same phenomenon, it seems obvious to 
operationalize the latter phenomenon with an eye to excluding indicators that measure aspects of party and 
not the system. This is something classical indicators (e.g., fragmentation, volatility) do not avoid. 
15 As Mainwaring and Scully (1995) originally maintained, party system institutionalization should be seen not as 
a dichotomous, but a continuous phenomena. 
16
 As summarised by Müller and Strom (2000:12), the three criteria that are usually used to indicate a change of 
government or cabinet are (i) a change in the party composition; (ii) a change in the prime ministership; and (iii) 
new elections. 
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the spoils of office or whether some parties were permanently excluded from participation 
in government. 
Based on these factors, Mair constructs two ideal types of party competition. The 
first type is the open structure, where there are (1) partial alternations of governments, (2) 
no stable compositions of governing alternatives and (3) access to government has been 
granted to all relevant parties. The closed structure presupposes that (1) alternations of 
governments are either total or none, (2) governing alternatives are stable over a long 
period of time, and (3) some parties are permanently excluded from participation in national 
government. Going back to the question of party systems institutionalization, it can be 
argued that a closed structure of party competition corresponds to an institutionalized party 
system, while an open structure of competition implies that the party system is weakly or 
not institutionalized. 
[Table 1] 
In order to minimize subjective judgements and opinions in the measurement of the 
elements of party system institutionalization, I quantitatively operationalize each of the 
factors suggested by Mair. Government changes receive a value of 1 on all those variables 
which correspond to a closed structure of competition, and a value of 0 on all those 
characterizing an open structure. The three variables are given equal weight in calculating 
the composite index of governmental closure. Being closed on one account (e.g. having 
wholesale alternation), but open on the other two variables (having innovative coalition and 
new parties) results in 33.3 percent on the overall dimension of stabilization. The values of 
individual government-changes are summed up and divided by the number of government 
changes experienced in the period under study.17 
[Table 2] 
 Based on our own analysis, table 2 summarises the levels of systemic 
institutionalization in Eastern Europe. Our index seems to support the general view that the 
Hungarian and Czech party systems could be described as having the most stable party 
systems, as they clearly offer a higher measure of predictability to their voters. On the other 
hand, it also confirms the rather low levels of structuration displayed both in Bulgaria and 
Latvia. 
                                                 
17A factor analysis of the governmental patterns of interaction in 23 “Second” and “Third Wave” European 
democracies revealed that the three variables align along one single principal component. For more details on 
the operationalization and calculation of the degree of institutionalization in Eastern European party systems, 
see Casal Bértoa (2007). 
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Political party institutionalization in Eastern European democracies   
The discussion in section 2 provides clear justification for our choice of the dimensions of 
the concept of party institutionalization. Hence, not only are we interested in examining the 
overall rootedness of political parties, we are also interested in their organizational 
systemness. 
 The degree of party institutionalization at large has been traditionally operationalized 
in several ways and using multiple indicators: party discipline (Kreuzer and Pettai, 2003; 
Panebianco, 1988; Shabad and Słomczyński, 2004); party identification (Dalton and Weldon, 
2007; Mainwaring, 1998); party membership (Mair, 2005); levels of professionalization 
(Johnson, 2002) and personalism (Dix, 1992; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Mény, 1990), the 
capacity of parties to sponsor parties cross-nationally (Rose and Mackie, 1988), the 
percentage of independent candidates (Birch, 1998; Moser, 1999; Protysk and Wilson, 
2003), to name only a few.18 Unfortunately, and notwithstanding their validity, none of the 
indicators seems to measure at the same time both rootedness and systemness. In order to 
achieve the latter, and because party (identification, discipline, professionalism, etc.) data is 
not available for every unit in every electoral period, I employ here Lewis´ Index of Party 
Stabilization (IPS), which involves the progressive enhancement of the proportion of the 
total vote for political parties in a given election over time - by 20% for a party’s second 
appearance in parliament, 40% for the third, 60% for the fourth, 80% for the fifth, and so 
forth (Lewis, 2006:574-575). Therefore, if a parliamentary party gets 35% of the votes in the 
first election, 40% in the second, and 10% in the third; a second parliamentary party gets 
65% in the first election, 50% in the second, and 80% in the third; and a third party gets into 
parliament only after the second election with 10% of the vote; the IPS is calculated in the 
following way: for the first election 35+65=100, for the second [48 (40+40*0.2)+60 
(50+50*0.2)+10]=118, and for the third [14 (10+10*0.4)+112 (80+10*0.4)+12 
(10+10*0.2)]=138. Then, the summed of the enhanced representation score in the three 
elections is divided by a notional total score of 360 (i.e. 100% for the first election, 120% for 
the second, and 140% for the third) and multiplied by 100. The logic is that, taking notice of 
both voter stability in voters´ electoral preferences and the age of a party organization,19 the 
                                                 
18 The absence of presidential elections in 4 of our 9 cases rules out a measure used elsewhere – i.e., the 
difference between presidential and legislative voting. 
19 Party age has been widely regarded by scholars as the most important measure of an organization (Dix, 
1992; Huntington, 1968; Janda, 1980; Jin, 1995; Robert and Wibbels, 1999), with old parties considered to be 
more institutionalized than new ones. The logic is that, with some exceptions, effective institutions grow 
slowly, and the older and organization is, the more likely it is to endure even longer. 
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IPS measures the two dimensions of party institutionalization mentioned above. Table 3 
presents descriptive statistics of the degree of party institutionalization in Eastern Europe. 
[Table 3] 
The above-displayed table does not greatly change the picture of institutionalization 
presented in Table 2, in as much as Hungary and the Czech Republic once again show 
stronger signs of political party institutionalization than the other Eastern European 
counterparts. It does, however, confirm that party and party system institutionalization, 
although closely related, are still distinct phenomena. From this perspective, weakly 
institutionalized Romanian, Slovenian and Bulgarian party systems count with the presence 
of more stable political parties than in other more institutionalized systems (e.g. Lithuania or 
Poland). 
 
The quality of democracy in Eastern European democracies  
As Inglehart and Welzel have recognized, “the essence of democracy is that it empowers 
ordinary citizens” (2008:128). However, the means through which people are able to decide 
vary widely among democratic systems. This means that some countries will perform better 
than others in terms of democratic quality. It is in order to quantitatively measure the latter 
that an index is needed. 
Although there are several ways of measuring democracy (Munck and Verkuilen, 
2002; Przeworski, 2000), undoubtedly the single most widely-used measure of the quality of 
democracy in “Third Wave” democracies is the composite measure reported on annual 
basis by Freedom in the World of the extent to which political rights and civil liberties are 
widely distributed and securely guaranteed (e.g. Ekiert, 2003; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Stockton, 
2001; Vachudova, 2005). However, the Freedom in the World scores are an imperfect 
measure of the quality of democracy as they do not take into account all the dimensions of 
quality mentioned in section 3. In fact, out of the five dimensions of the quality of 
democracy, the Freedom in the World scores only fully refer to one (i.e. freedom) and 
partially to other two (i.e., equality and vertical accountability): rule of law, responsiveness 
and horizontal accountability are completely ignored by them. To overcome this problem, 
we use both the “corruption” and “judicial framework and independence” indices developed 
by Nations in Transit. These scores judge, respectively how corrupt the political, bureaucratic 
and economic practices of a country are, but also the degree to which citizens are equal 
before the law and to what extent the judicial power is independent. In this sense, the 
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Nations in Transit scores here reported fully measure a nation´s rule of law, but also some 
aspects regarding three of the other four dimensions, namely: equality, horizontal 
accountability, and responsiveness (it is assumed that if political elites are not corrupt, they 
will respond better to the interest of voters in particular, and citizens in general). A first 
indication of the (content) validity (Adcock and Collier, 2001:538-540) of the latter is that 
the combined score of corruption and judicial framework and independence (from now on I 
will refer to it simply as “rule of law”),20 is that it includes more dimensions than any other 
of the measures of democracy traditionally used (e.g., Freedom in the World, Polity IV, etc.). 
A second indication of the (convergent) validity (Adcock and Collier, 2001:540-542) of this 
later estimate is that it strongly correlates with the majority of the classical measures of 
democratic quality, namely: Freedom in the World, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and 
Hadenius and Teorell´s composite Index (2005).21 Consequently, I operationalize “quality of 
democracy” (QoD) as the interaction between freedom rights and rule of law. 
I measure freedom rights using the combined Freedom in the World (FiW) scores 
for civil and political rights.22 Rule of Law is measured using the combined Nations in Transit 
(NiT) scores for corruption and judicial framework and independence. The scores from 
Freedom House (both FiW and NiT) range from 1 to 7 on each of the scales, with 1 
indicating the highest and 7 the lowest level.23 Since rule of law is considered to be a 
weighting factor and not a compensating factor,24 I multiply (instead of adding) freedom 
rights by rule of law: 
QoD=Freedom rights*Rule of law 
This produces an index of the quality of democracy that has 49 as its maximum and 1 
as its minimum. In order to ensure that my measure of the quality of democracy is 
subsequent in time to the institutionalization indicators and, at the same time, avoid 
endoneneity, I have collected the quality scores lagged by one year: therefore, the most 
                                                 
20 It is important to note here that prior to 2004, Nations in Transit reported measures of corruption and 
judicial framework and independence in a single composite score denominated “rule of law”. 
21 Our measure of the “quality of democracy” scores correlate significantly (p˂.01) both with Freedom in the 
World (0.776) and Bertelsmann Transformation Index (0.823). It does also moderately correlate with 
Hadenius and Teorell´s combined score (0.309, n.s.). Interestingly enough, although in the expected direction, 
it correlates very weakly with Polity IV (0.020, n.s.) 
22 On the validity of these indices compared to other democracy ratings see Bollen and Paxton (2000). 
23 On the use of continuous, rather than dichotomous, measures of democracy see Bollen and Jackman (1989), 
Elkins (2000) or Inglehart (2003). 
24 The idea of the “rule of law” as a weighting (not compensating) factor is taken from Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005, chapter 8). 
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recent Freedom House scores from 2008 are used, providing a measure of the quality of 
democracy in 2007. 
[Table 4] 
As Table 4 illustrates, Slovenia and Estonia display the higher levels of democratic 
quality among post-communist (consolidated) democracies, although Hungary and the 
Czech Republic closely follow suit. On the other side of the scale, the quality of democracy 
in Latvia and Bulgaria can be characterised as most certainly deficient. 
 
Party system institutionalization and the quality of democracy in Eastern 
Europe  
Since an increasing score on the Freedom House indexes (both Freedom in the World and 
Nations in Transit) represents a decreasing quality of democracy, a negative correlation 
between the level of party system stability and a country´s rating on the our index of 
democratic quality is expected by and would lend support to our first hypothesis that the 
degree of institutionalization of a nation´s party system is associated with the quality of its 
democracy. A fairly strong negative correlation is found (-.501), although the results are not 
significant (table 5). However, this may simply be due to the rather low number of the cases 
being examined (just nine). 
[Table 5] 
When analysing the nature of the relationship between both phenomena, a cubic line 
of fit is found (figure 1), indicating that cases in the middle range of democratic quality 
rankings are fairly well distributed along the x axis, thereby creating a dip in the line. Thus, 
countries with the country with highest system institutionalization score (Hungary) displays 
a fairly high level of democratic quality. Countries in the midrange of system 
institutionalization rankings (Poland, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic) exhibit the greatest 
similarity in quality rankings, certainly suggesting that midranges of party system scores have 
less a straightforward effect on the functioning of democracy (Estonia being the main 
exception). Finally, and with the exception of Slovenia, cases with the lowest scores of 
institutionalization (Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovakia) are also among the lowest in terms of 
democratic quality. 
[Figure 1] 
Moreover, when dichotomizing the cases into halves along both axes, we find that 
three of the five cases ranked in the top half of system rankings are located in the top half of 
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democracy rankings, while in parallel three of the four less institutionalized systems fall in 
the bottom half of democracy rankings. In other words, while high levels of party system 
institutionalization are certainly associated with better functioning democracies (e.g. 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania), only very low levels of institutionalization are 
systematically associated with lower levels of democracy (e.g. Latvia, and Bulgaria). 
On the other hand, and contrarily to what could have been expected, it is important 
to note that the relationship between party system institutionalization and the quality of 
democracy appears to be double-peaked, suggesting that countries pass through threshold 
points that have a positive effect on the quality of democracy just prior to passing through, 
followed by a marked decline just after passing through, before reaching a certain point 
where more institutionalization is certainly equivalent to a healthier functioning of 
democracy. As in Stockton´s analysis of the relationship between party system 
institutionalization and the level of democracy in new Latin American and East Asian 
democracies, we also find that “countries pass through more than one threshold toward 
democracy […] instead of the more common view that there exists only a single threshold 
that when passed will lead to the [excellence] of democracy” (2001:112). 
Notwithstanding the latter, I am on safe ground when concluding that, in general 
there is a positive, although not linear, relationship between party system institutionalization 
and the quality of democracy; in other words, as the institutionalization of a country´s party 
system increases, the quality of its democracy tends to improve.25 
Party system institutionalization and the quality of democracy in Eastern 
Europe  
Bearing all the arguments put forward in section 4, a positive relationship between party 
institutionalization and the quality of democracy is expected. In contrast to what we has 
been seen so far, the correlation coefficient, although in the expected direction, is 
everything but relevant (-0.182),26 not to say significant (table 6), providing a very weak 
support for our second hypothesis that the degree of the institutionalization of political 
parties in a political system is associated with the quality of its democracy.27 Moreover, 
                                                 
25 In fact, when I control for any of both of the two “outliers” (i.e. Estonia and Slovenia), the correlation 
coefficients immediately increase, acquiring significance (p˂.05) in the latter two cases (i.e. when I exclude only 
Slovenia or both countries at the same time). 
26 Please do remember what has been said about the fact that an increasing score on both of the Freedom 
House indexes represents a decreasing quality of democracy. 
27 It is important to note here that even if not relevant or significant, the relationship between party 
institutionalization and a nation´s quality of democracy is still positive, contradicting Stockton´s (2001:113-115) 
previous findings on the negative character of the abovementioned relationship. 
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although the best line of fit is still cubic (single peaked), the R-squared (0.138) is dramatically 
smaller in comparison to the test based on party system institutionalization scores.28 
[Table 6] 
 These findings are important because not only question the general assumption the 
party institutionalization is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the quality of 
democracy (Diamond and Linz, 1989; Huntington, 1968; Mainwaring, O´Donnell and 
Valenzuela, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995); but also seem to question the main idea 
defended by some scholars that party assistance may help democracies not only to 
consolidate but flourish (see Burnell, 2006; Carothers, 2006). 
However, this is not to say that party institutionalization does not have anything to 
do with the quality of democracy. As it result also from table 6, the institutionalization of 
the political parties conforming a party system seems to be positively (although not 
significantly) correlated with the stabilization and, therefore, institutionalization of that 
system as a whole (0.402). In fact, as it has been sustained elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c), a key prerequisite for party system institutionalization is having a party 
system whose member parties do not often change, are strongly rooted in society, and at 
the same time possess solid organizations (see also Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Rose and 
Munro, 2003). For all these reasons, it seems reasonable and plausible to conclude that, 
although indirectly, party institutionalization also contributes to a nation´s quality of 
democracy. Bearing in mind the latter, we may conclude with Diamond and Linz in that the 
degree of party institutionalization is still a “crucial [but indirect] consideration for 
democracy” (1989:21). In other words, if parties do not become institutionalized over time, 
a country´s prospects for developing stable patterns of inter-party competition are limited, 
and consequently its quality of democracy is likely to suffer. 
Conclusion  
Since Mainwaring and Scully (1995) trumpeted the importance of well institutionalized 
political parties and party systems for the consolidation and good functioning of democracy, 
numerous scholars have focused their efforts of the study of the relationship between 
institutionalization and democracy. Unfortunately, neither causation nor correlation 
between the two phenomena had been unambiguously demonstrated. This paper has sought 
to address this issue and bridge the gap by examining the relationship between party/party 
                                                 
28 Due to its lack of explanatory power, the figure illustrating the relationship between party institutionalization 
and the quality of democracy in young Eastern European democracies is not reported here. 
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system institutionalization and the level of democracy in 9 new Eastern European 
democracies. 
The results of this analysis broadly support the traditional thesis that party and party 
system institutionalization are both important for the quality of democracy. However, while 
party system institutionalization seems to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
the good functioning of democracy, it is only through the enhancement of the former that 
party institutionalization contributes (therefore, indirectly) to the quality of democracy in a 
polity. In any case, however, the relationship between institutionalization and the operation 
of democratic regimes may be considered to be neither unidirectional nor linear, 
demonstrating on the whole that the path toward democratic deepening is everything, but 
an easy one in which institutionalization and democracy go hand in hand. 
If anything, the results suggest that more work needs to be done. First, it is 
necessary to extend the number of cases to allow for regression analysis as well as applying 
a more dynamic methodology. Second, because bivariate correlations give no indication of 
the direction of causality, an in-depth analysis of the sources and symptoms of 
institutionalization and democracy remains a necessary task. It is mainly for this reason that 
a case-study of those countries (outliers) where low levels of institutionalization are 
associated with relatively high levels democracy needs to be undertaken. Third, further 
research is needed to determine the specific threshold of institutionalization after which 
gains in quality of democracy level off. Finally, the absence of a significant direct correlation 
between party institutionalization and democracy may not be surprising, but nonetheless is 
important enough to be dealt with. In this sense, this analysis calls for an extension, so we 
may understand how the effects of institutionalization on the quality of a democratic polity 
may vary by region or regime type. 
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Tables  
Table 1. Party system institutionalization (operationalization) 
Features Institutionalized 
Party systems 
Weakly institutionalized 
party systems 
Alternation of government Wholesale/None (1) Partial (0) 
Governing formulae Familiar (1) Innovative (0) 
Access to government Closed (1) Open (0) 
Source: Adapted from Mair (1996:95) 
 
Table 2. Party system institutionalization in Eastern Europe 
Countries Time Span Index of PSI (%) 
Hungary 1990-2006 77.8 
Czech Republic 1993-2006 55.6 
Lithuania 1992-2006 55.6 
Poland 1991-2006 46.2 
Estonia 1992-2006 44.4 
Slovenia 1993-2006 33.3 
Slovakia 1993-2006 33.3 
Bulgaria 1991-2006 25.0 
Latvia 1993-2006 23.8 
Sources: All data on party systems and government formation are based on Müller-Rommel et al. (2004), but 
cross-checked with information provided by the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbooks, 
and by country experts and sources on the World Wide Web. 
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Table 3. Party institutionalization in Eastern Europe 
Countries Electoral periods IPS (%) 
Hungary 5 90.8 
Czech Republic 5 86.0 
Slovenia 4 84.8 
Bulgaria 5 79.7 
Estonia 4 75.5 
Latvia 5 73.9 
Lithuania 4 73.3 
Slovakia 5 70.3 
Poland 5 62.9 
Sources: Lewis (2006), and own calculations. 
 
Table 4. The Quality of Democracy in Eastern Europe 
Country Democratic Quality Score (2007) 
Slovenia 1.88 
Estonia 2.00 
Hungary 2.38 
Czech Republic 2.63 
Lithuania 2.75 
Poland 2.75 
Slovakia 2.88 
Latvia 3.57 
Bulgaria 4.70 
Sources: Freedom in the World (2007) and Nations in Transit (2007). 
 
Table 5. Party system institutionalization and the quality of democracy 
 Quality of democracy 
Party System 
Institutionalization 
Pearson Correlation -.501 
Sig. (2-tailed) .169 
N 9 
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Table 6. Party institutionalization and the quality of democracy 
 Quality of 
democracy 
Party System 
Institutionalization 
Party 
Institutionalization 
Pearson Correlation -.182 .402 
Sig. (2-tailed) .640 .284 
N 9 9 
 
 
Figure 1. Party system institutionalization and the quality of democracy 
 
